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Abstract 
In this article, I examine the ways in which governing bodies at the Finnish national and also 
European Union levels talk about young people and our shared future in Finland. I use their 
youth policy documents as material for critical discourse analysis. My argument is that, 
besides presenting visions of a desired future, these papers also produce and reproduce 
divisions between young people that reflect gender and class positions. Young people are 
divided into those who have potential, those who will take care of others’ needs, and those 
who are at risk of marginalisation. I also argue that the Nordic policy tendency to conceive of 
youth as a resource rather than as a problem is not consistent. Finnish youth policy has 
changed, firstly because of the changing economic environment – the politics of austerity – 
and secondly because of Europeanisation.  
Introduction 
When young people are talked about, they usually represent the future, either as a promise or 
as a source of worry (e.g. White & Wyn 2013; France 2007). In order to examine the ways in 
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which governing bodies talk about young people and our shared future, I analyse their youth 
policy documents as data. The hopes and fears expressed in these bodies’ policy documents 
usually relate to youth employability; more specifically, they refer to education, work and 
employment.  The focus of this article is on the national Finnish level but EU documents are 
also inspected in relevant contexts. Youth policy here is understood as a form of social policy 
targeting young people (see Wallace & Bendit 2009).  
Clare Wallace and Rene Bendit (2009) have found that some EU countries focus in their 
youth policies on the young as a resource, while others present them as a problem. They place 
the Nordic countries in the former category, while for example the UK and Ireland represent 
the latter. Nordic youth policies target all young people, not just problem cases, and resources 
are distributed to all. Wallace and Bendit call this model the ‘universalistic youth policy 
regime’, and dub the focus on problem youth the ‘community-based youth policy regime’. 
Intermediate models are ‘protective youth policy regimes’ (for the promotion and support of 
the young) and ‘centralised youth policy regimes’ (created only in response to European 
initiatives).  
Wallace and Bendit (2009) argue that the European Union plays only an advisory role in 
relation to national politics, and does not address important problems such as unemployment. 
However, economic crises and the Europeanisation of youth policy – making it more 
coherent among EU member countries – may have changed the situation. Nevertheless, there 
are many references to EU and European Commission (EC) documents in recent Finnish 
youth policy documents, especially in the context of employment and education.  
In this article I focus not so much on changes in youth policies, but more on changes (and 
continuities) in the ideas about youth employment behind the policies. I examine governing 
talk about the future in the light of feminist analyses of the new economy, neoliberalism and 
the new austerity (Adkins 2008, 2015; Coleman 2016; McDowell 2012; Berlant 2011). These 
ideas relate to economic fluctuations, class and gender, and also to changes in the affectual 
environment (especially Berlant 2011; Coleman 2016) or structures of feeling (Clarke & 
Newman 2012). These analyses reflect the political environment, namely neoliberalism, 
which is the context of expectations surrounding young people and youth policies.i. The 
Finnish case is that neoliberal capitalism is getting stronger, while social-democratic 
capitalism is losing its stronghold (and protectionist capitalism is gaining ground in the form 
of nationalist populism) (Walby 2011; Nikunen 2013 and 2016).  
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My argument is that, as well as presenting visions of a desired future, youth policy papers 
also produce and reproduce divisions between young people. While the explicit aim 
presented in youth policy documents is inclusion and equality, they can also cause exclusion 
and further inequalities. Young people’s futures are classed and gendered (and often also 
ethnicised, nationalised and localised), for instance by differentiating between their 
potentials. Different bodies are placed in different spatio-temporal positions, and their 
abilities to be mobile and gain value are anticipated. In this article I focus on ruptures in good 
intentions – the possibilities of inequality that are built into neutral discourse about equality 
and fulfilment for all.   
 
Young adults and employment in the Finnish context 
As elsewhere in the EU, youth unemployment is high in Finland. One in six 15–24-year-olds 
was out of employment or education in June 2014, and one in ten 25–34-year-olds was 
registered unemployed (OSF 2014). Those defined as ‘marginalised’ or socially excluded – 
i.e. having no vocational training, and being out of employment or education – represented 
5% of 15–29-year-olds in 2011 (Myrskylä 2011). 
The number of those marginalised has not actually grown since the 1990s in Finland 
(Myrskylä 2011). However, discourses on youth vulnerability, lack of citizenship and at-risk 
youth without entrepreneurial skills have intensified among policymakers in developed 
countries (Kelly 2006; Foster & Spencer 2011; McLeod 2012). Moreover, working-class 
career paths have not changed so dramatically, although the chances of finding a permanent 
job have become more uncertain. It has been claimed that it is mainly middle-class youth, and 
their parents, who are worried that higher education no longer guarantees good employment 
prospects (Tolonen 2005; Skeggs 2004).  
The employment situation is difficult for young people, and worries about the future are 
justified. But not all worries relate to all young people or accurately reflect recent changes. 
Indeed, sometimes the concerns represented in youth policies reflect not so much a wish to 
help the young as a desire to make a better future for others. In the new economy, this better 
future is seen though a neoliberal lens, and is defined by government elites. Young people are 
said to be future adults or people-in-the-making (Foster & Spencer 2011). They represent the 
futurity in the present.  
4 
 
 
 
Futurity, employability, gender and class 
Lisa Adkins (2008) has stated that in post-industrial capitalism one’s value as a worker, or the 
value of one’s work, does not simply stem from the capacities one has acquired. The futurity, 
or future promise, of what one is expected to do and achieve is more important than what you 
are already able to do or have done. The value of one’s work depends on expected gain, and 
so does the value of the worker.  
In education policy this potential is reflected in the use of the term ‘employability’ instead of 
‘employment’. This refers to the idea that formal education – learned skills and qualifications 
– is not enough for employment, and one has to do more: to learn skills outside the 
curriculum, and to present oneself as having the sought-for potential (e.g. Harvey 2001). It 
has been claimed that employability talk is used to mask the existence of advantages outside 
and before schooling, such as bodily capacities, middle-class cultural and economic 
capacities, and the ways that gendered assumptions affect the process of employment (ibid; 
Morley 2001). In this sense, ‘employability’ is how one is able to perform not only in specific 
work tasks, but also in the imagined future: it is about ‘futurity’.  
Joseph Borlagdan (2015) states that in field(s) of employment, different capitals provide 
employability, while the lack of them positions young people in situations that demand 
flexibility and innovation and may even cause ‘symbolic violence’. For instance, being 
ethnically other is a lack in the field of high-tech employment. There is a game (or games) of 
employability that one is required to play in order to achieve the promised goal of 
employment; however, playing the game requires a sense of the game (social and cultural 
capital), recognition as a competent player, and recognition of one’s achievements/capacities 
as legitimate. This requires that one’s body fit into the game played on the field (Bourdieu 
1990; McNay 1999; Adkins 2004).  
These diverse ways to achieve marketable capitals explain why women and working-class 
people’s increased opportunities to gain capacities, skills and qualifications have not resulted 
in their economic success (Adkins 2008). In Finland, despite the social-democratic ideals of 
education, social mobility has been decreasing in recent decades (Paananen et al. 2012; Erola 
2012). Additionally, a recent study on gender segregation in the employment of higher-
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education graduates reveals that men find employment faster after graduation than women. 
Furthermore, men are employed in higher positions and receive permanent contracts more 
often than women (Vuorinen-Lampila 2014). Thus the group that has benefited from equal 
access to education in the UK, middle-class women (McDowell 2012), is not doing so well in 
Finland. 
The ideas of employability and futurity are easily related to higher education, international 
mobility and global competition (see Nikunen 2013 and 2016; Yoon 2014). Competition in 
the global market is one of the main concerns of governing elites and policymakers in 
Finland (e.g. Kantola 2006). However, there is also a concern about Finland’s ageing 
population and weakening dependency ratio (e.g. Ruotsalainen 2013); there should be 
taxpayers, people who are employed, in the future too. There should also be people who 
shoulder caring responsibilities and infrastructures (Nikunen 2013). In addition to 
entrepreneurial (e.g. Kelly 2006) and international motivations, young people are required to 
become worker citizens to meet the needs of the labour markets (Pehkonen 2013). Thus I 
argue that ideas about the ‘old economy’ persist alongside those about the new economy. It 
might be that austerity politics is strengthening that trend (while creating new ones).  
Nonetheless, in this paper I will argue that youth policies – at least on the surface level – 
present all young people as having bodies fitted to anything, and encourage optimism even 
when times are austere. However, the ”pain” is not shared equally, and cuts affect different 
people in different ways, thus ‘new landscapes of inequality” are likely produced. The public 
sector is seen as a waste and promises of growth can be seen in private enterprise (Clarke & 
Newman 2012). 
 
Data and analysis 
In my analysis, I use youth policy documents from Finnish national government bodies and 
the EU in some cases. The criteria for selection were that the documents must 1) focus on 
employment and education,ii and 2) show an interactive relationship between national and EU 
policy. Beside interaction with EU, the Finnish documents contain messages to lower levels 
of youth policy, social policy and education.   The focus of the article is more on the national 
than the EU level. However, EU documents are emphasised in the discussion of mobility, 
since this is the area over which the EU is most influential and where there is concrete 
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cooperation between EU states, such as the Erasmus programme. In the discussion of Finnish 
labour market demands and education, I focus on Finnish data, since these problems are 
tackled at a national level.  
The documents are these: 1) Green Paper on the Learning Mobility of Young People by the 
European Commission (2009); 2) Green Paper on Learning Mobility: Contribution by 
CIMO, Centre for International Mobility, Finland (2009); 3) the European Commission’s 
Youth on the Move: An Initiative to Unleash the Potential of Young People to Achieve Smart, 
Sustainable and Inclusive Growth in the European Union (2010); 4) the Ministry of 
Finance’s Labour Markets of the Young: How Could Youth Employment Be Enhanced? 
(2010); and 5) Youth Guarantee: Content and Aims by the Ministry of Employment and the 
Economy (TEM) (2013). The first three documents are concerned with international mobility, 
the fourth with education and employment, and last with the Youth Guarantee.  
In the analysis, I first draw a picture of general tendencies in conceptions of youth, work and 
the future in these documents, utilising critical discourse analysis. Critical discourse analysis 
requires an analysis of intricate relationships between text, talk, cognition, power, society and 
culture (van Dijk 1993). It does not restrict interpretations of what is happening to the data 
under analysis. There can, and should, be references outside the data: what is known about 
the phenomena, existing ideologies, actors and their power relations, and existing discourses. 
I focus on issues of power and ideology which are in the analysis inspected from the point of 
view of recent feminist discussions of the ‘new economy’ and the affectual environment it 
has created.  
Secondly, I map out what spatial choices and actions are preferred, asking what one should 
not do and which groups are considered to have problems with the preferred action. I focus 
on examining ways in which differences between young people are written about and how 
young people are categorised. I also track the actions and features attributed to different 
young people, applying ideas of membership categorisation analysis (Sacks 1972). As often 
within the tradition of critical discourse analysis, the analysis is not simply data-driven, but is 
in dialogue with the aforementioned theories.  
Policy documents are often socially neutral at first sight. According to Wallace and Bendit 
(2009, 499), in EU countries youth politics, gender and ethnicity are seldom addressed 
directly. Therefore, instead of explicit categorisations, I track actions and features that are 
conventionally attached to known identity membership categories (see Sacks 1972; Watson 
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1983). Thus I focus on passages where it is possible to read the text as referring to, or 
addressing, certain groups of young people. In other words, I have selected from the data 
passages that provide materials for criticism – ruptures in class and gender neutrality, and in 
the Nordic idea of ‘the young as a resource’.  
I present my findings starting with the main discourses I have found, and then move on to 
inspect them more closely, addressing their classed and gendered aspects.  
 
Discourses on young people 
In recent years, we have witnessed a gradual change in the way that governing elites talk 
about young people and their future. This is mainly due to economic changes and setbacks in 
the new economy, and the declining optimism wrought by the new economy and the ‘creative 
class’. Some authors write about ‘(new) austerity’, referring to a shift in capitalist politics 
from an emphasis on growth and investment to one on recession and public-sector cuts (e.g. 
Adkins 2015; McDowell 2012). Thus being worried about young people might now be more 
common than believing in their creative potential, although these ways of conceptualising 
youth and the future coexist. However, in this paper I will argue that these concerns are 
different for different young people.  
I use Lauren Berlant’s (2011) concept of ‘cruel optimism’ to emphasise that some future 
visions offered to the young can be unrealistically optimistic for some. The optimistic 
promise – a cluster of desires – is not easy for all to achieve or maintain, and it can be toxic 
and affect you in ways that you did not anticipate. It also deceives those who have difficulty 
finding and maintaining their footing ‘in worlds that are not there for them’ (McCabe 2011). 
Indeed, for the sake of our shared future, elites also present other paths to happiness – or at 
least paths to avoid unhappiness. In times of austerity these visions reflect more pessimism, 
although this pessimism can be termed ‘hopeful pessimism’: even though the future is grim 
for young people on average, you might be lucky (Coleman 2016).  
These different emphases are also reflected in the three main discourses about young people, 
work and education I have mapped from the policy documents (see Table 1). The first 
discourse relates to the idea of youth as a resource: mobility and internationalisation are seen 
as key to improve the employability of young people. In the second, there is a mixed 
discussion of young people as both a resource and a problem: young people should get the 
8 
 
right education in order to meet labour market demands. In the third, youth are seen as a 
problem, based on a discourse of marginalisation. In the following pages I will examine these 
discourses further. 
 
Employability: mobility, internationalisation and creativity 
In modern society, success stories are about social mobility. Mobility is a key to success in 
late-modern societies such as the new capitalism too. However, the current political agenda is 
not about social mobility, but about being mobile as a social actor, a worker in space and 
time, in relation to social locus (Thrift 2005; Skeggs 2004). In youth policies, concrete or 
spatial mobility is often presented as a central way to gain employability (Yoon 2014). 
However, not every kind of mobility is good for employability, and not every mobile person 
can turn their mobility into employability and economic capital.  
In 2009, the EC paved the way for a common youth policy by distributing its Green Paper on 
Youth Mobility to relevant political bodies in order to gather national responses. In Finland, 
CIMO was consulted. In the EU, a green paper is a tentative government report and 
consultation document on policy proposals for debate and discussion, without any 
commitment to action – the first step in changing the law. Green papers may result in the 
production of a white paper. In this case there was no white paper, but in 2010 the EC 
introduced Youth on the Move: An Initiative to Unleash the Potential of Young People to 
Achieve Smart, Sustainable and Inclusive Growth in the European Union. Finland’s Ministry 
of Education used this initiative in its formulation of Finnish youth policies in Child and 
Youth Policy Programme 2012–2015.  
The EC’s mobility documents have a competitive and neoliberal edge, although on the other 
hand they also combat xenophobia and promote a greater understanding of other cultures 
(Nikunen 2013). The aforementioned 2010 initiative states: ‘Europe’s future prosperity 
depends on young people’ (EC 2010). The EC uses the word ‘employability’, while the 
Finnish authorities prefer ‘employment’. The common goal seems to be promoting the 
mobility of the young and those who work with them – decision makers have already reached 
a consensus:  
There is consensus among many decision makers that learning mobility is good for 
young people. However, the benefits of learning mobility may not be sufficiently 
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understood among young people themselves. A number of factors may contribute to 
keeping many young people from even considering a stay abroad: time pressure to 
finish their studies or training, jobs, lack of funding, lack of language skills and 
intercultural knowledge, as well as a general reluctance to leave ‘home’. Young 
people will be more open to mobility if the benefits of learning mobility are better 
explained to them. (EC 2009, 7, my emphasis) 
Young people should understand that completing their studies on time or getting a wage does 
not enhance their employability: immediate rewards and short-term perspectives are not 
beneficial, since one should invest in one’s futurity (Adkins 2008; Reay 2004). Poor language 
skills, lack of intercultural knowledge and reluctance to leave ‘home’ are also presented as 
features that are typical of young people with mobility attitude problems, which they should 
overcome in order to become valuable mobile subjects. This miscomprehension can be 
understood as a classed feature: a lack of cultural resources, an overly rigid reading of the 
rules of the educational game, and attachment to the local are often attributed to working-
class youth. Furthermore, what is ‘home’ to a cosmopolitan subject or ‘European citizen’? Is 
this not a pathetic position, a sign of giving up the promise of the good life, an inability to 
embody modernity (see Skeggs 2004)? 
In Finland, CIMO (2009) presents mobility as an opportunity that should be available to all, 
as demonstrated in the tone of its universalist youth policies. All young people should be 
encouraged into education or work abroad, even the unemployed and those in vocational 
training:  
Learning mobility should gradually be included as a formal part of national and local 
school curricula, university degree programmes, and in the work plans of youth 
services. Otherwise, it will be difficult to win widespread acceptance for learning 
mobility – or sufficient resources for full-scale learning mobility.  
Mobility should be available for all. We need different kinds of mobility: there are no 
one-size-fits-all solutions. (…) Current mobility instruments should be evaluated to 
assess how they respond to the needs of different target groups, and whether new 
forms of mobility are needed. In particular, we should further develop methods and 
approaches for internationalisation at home. (CIMO 2009, 1) 
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The surface-level inclusivity of this discourse creates the opportunity for cruel optimism 
(Berlant 2011). It emphasises that the possibility of future happiness is available for all who 
do as required. Thus young people become responsible for their own fate. However, the EU 
document reveals the characteristics that one must shed in order to be a mobile subject. It 
requires a reflexive reworking of values for working-class youth, who according to studies 
are more attached to locality than middle-class youth (e.g. Tolonen 2005; Allen & 
Hollingworth 2013). CIMO is simultaneously more inclusive and less demanding than the 
EC; you can become international at home, which is referred to without quotation marks.  
The documents are written in a gender-neutral way, and mobile subjectivity seems to be open 
to middle-class young women at least. Indeed, the EU initiative Youth on the Move sees 
young people as having good potential to be mobile, since they do not yet have family 
responsibilities (EC 2010, 10). However, the same document also reveals why it is so 
valuable to be mobile in education: those who are mobile as students will become mobile as 
workers. Later on, family responsibilities will matter and those burdened by them – or 
perceived to be burdened – will not benefit from their investments.  
The majority of ‘mobile’ people in the EU are between 25 and 34 years old. This age 
group tends to have better knowledge of languages and fewer family obligations. (EC 
2010, 10) 
Learning mobility is an important way in which young people can strengthen their 
future employability and acquire new professional competences, while enhancing 
their development as active citizens. It helps them to access new knowledge and 
develop new linguistic and intercultural competences. Europeans who are mobile as 
young learners are more likely to be mobile as workers later in life. Employers 
recognise and value these benefits. (EC 2010, 10) 
These documents somewhat reflect a gendered conception of mobility, coding new creative 
heroism as masculine (see Adkins 2008). This is partly because male-dominated professions 
are more mobile than female-dominated professions, and women travel with their spouses 
more often than men (Nivalainen 2010). However, the idea that men are more mobile is 
partly a stereotype (Ravenstein 1985 cited by Dumitru 2014, 204). According to recent 
emigration statistics, Finnish women are more likely to go abroad than men (Official 
Statistics Finland 2013). Learning mobility is also more common among women than men 
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(Garam 2014). Still, it seems that the international capacities acquired by young women do 
not translate into international career success as well as those of men do (Nivalainen 2010).  
While young women’s learning mobility is presented as natural, by contrast, talk about 
slightly older women assumes that they have problems with professional mobility because of 
their family responsibilities (e.g. Nikunen 2013). It is interesting that young people between 
25 and 34 years old are seen as having no family obligations. Even though the median age for 
having a first child is high in Finland, it is still only 28 for women and 30 for men (Official 
Statistics Finland 2013). It is also more common for those with less education to have a child 
at a younger age than for those with higher educational levels (Official Statistics Finland 
2013). Accordingly, the young people referred to as being without family responsibilities 
more likely represent middle-class persons than working-class, and are more likely men than 
women.  
However, not all mobility is good. Young Europeans – at least those with futurity – who 
travel abroad should come back. Indeed, it seems that in this discourse, national background 
disappears and all young people are European. The next extract deals with labour shortages 
and reveals the kind of workers that are valuable for the future:  
Facing future labour shortages, Europe needs to retain as many highly skilled workers 
as possible and also attract the right skills for the expected increase in labour 
demands. Special efforts will be needed to attract highly skilled migrants in the global 
competition for talent. […] As certain professions see too many Europeans emigrating 
and too few third- country immigrants coming in, policies should address this. This 
includes […] raising the attractiveness of jobs in professions which see brain- drain 
(e.g. scientific and medical professions) and identifying within the New Skills and 
Jobs initiative those occupations with shortages to which young talent within and 
outside the EU should be attracted. (EC 2010, 13–14, my emphasis) 
In the context of learning mobility, future labour shortages mean shortages of highly skilled 
workers, not care professionals or cleaners. A brain drain is a threat, not a ‘heart drain’ of 
emotional workers or ‘hand drain’ of body workers (see Dumitru 2014). Scientific and 
medical professions are mentioned as examples of brain drain.  
Employability takes better hold on certain bodies than others; some mobile bodies are 
recognised as international and mobile, while others may be misrecognised as immigrants or 
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spouses. Even feminists can conceive of third-world educated women as a ‘care drain’ and 
not recognise the brain drain they cause (Dumitru 2014). When combined with mobility, the 
value of the future worker is based on future potential. The brain drain is a corporeal 
metaphor that is sometimes conceived as gendered, as it values some skills but does not 
acknowledge others, and defines some sectors as economically productive while excluding 
sectors such as welfare and social reproduction (Dumitru 2014).  
Optimism can be cruel if one has a body to which the value of mobility does not attach itself 
as well as it does to other bodies. There are many young people who put their hopes in 
mobility but do not gain any material rewards. One must first fit the requirements of the 
category of ‘mobile youth’ who have no family responsibilities and no attachment to locality, 
who understand when the regulations should not be followed, and who are at home being 
European. Furthermore, they should have futurity: as an adult one should be a skilled and 
mobile worker in a profession that requires brains. These are features that suit the categories 
‘middle class’ and ‘man’ better than ‘working class’ and ‘woman’.  
 
Employment: capacities needed in labour markets 
Even though the demand for ‘brains’ and mobility seems prevalent, the future is no longer 
represented in terms of global fast-track growth and innovation, even in mobility documents. 
In times of austerity, optimistic ideas about youth and the future have turned to pessimism 
(Coleman 2016). Worries about the ageing population, growing unemployment and at-risk 
youth keep the concerns of the ‘old economy’ alive. A new feature may be that the private 
sector is seen as the expert on the capacities young people need for employment (Robertson 
& Dale 2013). These problems are mainly tackled on a national level, although the worries 
are shared by many EU countries.  
In Finland, the clearest example of concern about young people getting the right education is 
the Ministry of Finance’s (2010) document Labour Markets [sic] of the Young: How Could 
Youth Employment Be Enhanced? It is a response to the aforementioned 2008 EU initiative 
New Skills for New Jobs, and it tackles labour shortages somewhat differently than the EC’s 
Youth on the Move. New Skills for New Jobs sets out to improve the anticipation of future 
skills needs, develop a better match between skills and labour market needs, and bridge the 
gap between education and work. In its English abstract the document states that it analyses 
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‘the youth employment situation and assesses current and new labour market and education 
policy measures, intended to support youth employment’ (Ministry of Finance 2010). 
According to the document, there are four main obstacles to the integration of young people 
into the labour market: 1) drop-outs from basic education, 2) suspensions and non-
completions of education, 3) paid work while in education, which lengthens completion 
times, and 4) the relationship of education and location with employment demands. In the 
context of mobility, concern about completing education on time is presented as a 
misapprehension; here it is presented as a rule. The groups of young people to whom the 
message is addressed seem to vary, from those who have difficulty choosing to those who 
face serious problems and are ‘in danger of exclusion’. 
The answer – for those with fewer problems – seems to lie in choosing the right education, 
completing it on time, and being able and willing to move wherever the jobs are; in this 
context, this refers to mobility within Finland and to urban areas. There are some educational 
paths that guide young people into the wrong careers, and some that steer them towards the 
right ones.  
The list of bad career choices includes media and information, ICT, tourism, the beauty 
industry, arts and crafts, and electricity mechanics and automation technology. The good 
career choices are in social and healthcare, medicine, cleaning services, and machine, 
metallurgic and energy technology (MF 2010, 33–34). 
Education seems to be the answer, as local government should provide education that is in 
sync with labour market needs. Previously, local governments – because the financing of 
their schools depends on how many students they have – were ready to offer educational 
choices that young people wanted, such as in media, tourism, arts and culture (Ministry of 
Finance 2009). Young people who were trained to be self-confident individual subjects were 
eager to take their place in the creative class (Allen & Hollingsworth 2013). It is hinted here 
that they should be more realistic in their choices.  
The dependency ratio has been growing in Finland for a long time, and the younger 
generation is now smaller than the older. We need taxpayers, and above all we need people to 
take care of the ageing population. Society needs workers to take care of elderly, leaky bodies 
(see Wolkowitz 2011). So society still needs those whose labour value is counted by the hour 
(Adkins 2009). We need those who are willing to spend hours in low-paid jobs in the service 
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sector. Society needs those who can settle down in small villages as easily as in big cities, 
although most service sector vacancies are in those cities, where it is expensive to live. 
Mobile workers and older generations need local workers, people who work for the future of 
the others (see Thrift 2005).  
Even though this document is also written in a gender-neutral manner, we know that most of 
the jobs mentioned as preferable are highly gendered: care workers are mostly women, and 
technicians mostly men. In Finland, occupational gender segregation is resilient (Official 
Statistics Finland 2015). However, in the list of educational routes to be avoided, there are 
also gendered choices, such as the beauty industry, arts and crafts, ICT, and electricity and 
automation. The paper addresses young men and women equally, although the care sector is 
somewhat emphasised in this discourse. 
While young people can, in the learning mobility context, be quite old (up to 35), in the 
context of employment they are 15–24 years old. This is, of course, because PhD students are 
seen as ‘young’ since they ‘study’. Choosing the right education, however, is seen as 
happening earlier. Nonetheless, the main concern is about young people seeking or already in 
vocational training, since they are more likely to be unemployed (MF 2010, 26–27).  
As Wallace and Bendit (2009) write, different ministries have their own emphases 
concerning youth politics. We might see the Ministry of Finance as a key player in the 
politics of austerity in Finland. This ministry presents youth as a resource not for global 
competition, but for national maintenance. Its guidance is about not empowerment but 
restriction. Employability is not the correct term here; this is more about skills, qualifications 
and a willingness to do dirty and/or hard work, rather than having the right personality and an 
impressive CV full of extracurricular activities. Young people are expected to grow into 
working citizens (Pehkonen 2013). 
The characteristics of youth with the right skills are somewhat different from those who are 
mobile: they can have local attachments, but have to be ready to move for their education; 
they should follow rules – the regulations are for them, as deterrents as well as incentives; 
and they should grow up to be proper Finnish citizens. As adults they will be skilled workers 
in the service of our care sector or infrastructure. These are characteristics that suit the 
category ‘working class’ better than ‘middle class’. Care suits women, and maintenance work 
suits men.  
15 
 
 
 
Marginalisation: citizenship skills 
Growing youth unemployment is an obvious key concern when social exclusion is discussed. 
Marginalisation and underprivileged young people have even cropped up in discussions 
within mobility documents (EC 2010), as well as in documents on labour shortages (Ministry 
of Finance 2010). In Finland and the EU, the main policy to tackle the problem is the Youth 
Guarantee (Ministry of Employment and the Economy 2013; EC 2013). 
The Youth Guarantee is a social innovation in which ‘early intervention and activation are 
key’ (EC 2013). The idea is that agencies cooperate in order to reach young people (aged 
under 25 or 29) who are at risk of exclusion from work and education. The Finnish scheme is 
presented as a success story by the EC (ibid.).  
Interestingly, the discourse of marginalisation seems to have hijacked the traditional tools of 
youth work. In the context of marginalisation, workshops and other forms of youth work 
appear to be forms of ‘activation’. This fluctuation is not a new or surprising phenomenon; 
during its history, Finnish youth work has always borne different meanings, aims and 
functions, reflecting hegemonic ideologies of the times (Nieminen 2013). Obviously, actors 
in different policy fields also have their own angles on youth work, and they thus attribute it 
with their own aims (see Wallace & Bendit 2009). My claim is that this shift has 
impoverished the perception of youth work and workshops, the picture of young people using 
these services and young unemployed people.  
Young people who are unemployed and lack professional competence after basic education 
or upper-secondary school are offered vocational training by the ministry. Agents who offer 
apprenticeship programmes are offered more resources as well as youth workshops and youth 
outreach workers. Higher education does not seem to be on offer, even though those with 
upper-secondary (high-school) qualifications are included.  
The workshops offer a place for young people to learn life skills, grow into adulthood and get 
hands-on experience of work, encouraging and helping them to seek further training 
(Ministry of Employment and the Economy 2013, 8-9.). 
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 A workshop offers the young person an opportunity for guided and supported work, 
and a tailored path to education, finishing education in cooperation with the education 
provider, or becoming employed in the open labour market. 
The purpose of youth outreach work is to help under-29-year-olds who are outside 
education or the labour market, and who need support to access public-sector services 
or to commit to an available service, or who are at risk of social exclusion. (Ministry 
of Employment and the Economy 2013, 8–9.) 
According to the document, these young people need to get hands-on experience of work and 
grow into adulthood. These measures offer a mixture of support and empowerment, whereas 
the measures to encourage people into education are mainly deterrents (if you do not apply, 
you will not get unemployment benefits).  
This Youth Guarantee as an answer to the discourse of youth marginalisation is similar to 
discourses about youth vulnerability and at-risk-youth mentioned earlier (Kelly 2006; Foster 
& Spencer 2011; McLeod 2012). Early intervention and activation (incentives and deterrents) 
are the measures used (Foster & Spencer 2011). The discourse also presupposes vulnerability, 
which means that the young people talked about are not seen as fully competent citizens. This 
legitimises the interventions and may also reduce their rights as citizens (McLeod 2012). 
In these documents, marginalisation concerns mainly lower-class young people who might 
work in low-paid jobs in the bodily, social and technical maintenance of society. ‘Hands-on 
experience’ seems to refer to the working-class ideal of manual labour. These young people 
might be part of the answer to the problem of an ageing society. However, it is also hinted 
that even smaller signs of integration into society would be welcome, such as being a 
competent consumer of public-sector services.  
In Finnish and European contexts, marginalisation is usually related to immobility – both 
social and spatial. If the young people that the Ministry of Finance is worried about are 
moving in the wrong directions, marginalised young people are presented as those who are 
stuck in their locality and its problems. If other young people acquire skills and invest in 
themselves, the targets of the Youth Guarantee are helped, pushed and offered alternative 
routes to employment. They are even supported ‘to access public-sector services or to commit 
to an available service’ (TEM 2013).  
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These young people who are without work and education are recognised as people without 
life skills, and needing help and support. This large component of the youth population is 
presented as incapable of making choices and acting as proper, able-bodied and able-minded 
individuals. Actually, the group that the Youth Guarantee concerns is quite large and 
heterogeneous. There are those who have earned high-school diplomas but have not got into 
the universities or colleges of their choice; there are those who want to take a year off; and 
those who have physical or mental health problems. The measures proposed in the Youth 
Guarantee may help some and be a deterrent for others. They may also place many people in 
the category of ‘at-risk youth’, especially when the emphasis is on early intervention, which 
is arguably a labelling rather than a helping device (Foster & Spencer 2011). Furthermore, 
some people, and some forms of marginalisation, may be left without help, for instance if the 
cause of exclusion is the ‘burnout’ of those with education – who are often women.  
When marginalisation is defined as being without work and without vocational training, it is 
a men’s problem – or an immigrants’ problem (Myrskylä 2011). However, this is not the only 
way to define the term. Social exclusion can also occur after one has gained an education, due 
to psychological problems, for instance. This broader definition would include more women.  
Those who are at-risk are characterised as not full adults, and as lacking in some basic skills, 
and their best possible future is to get hands-on work (by implication, in material rather than 
immaterial labour). They are becoming-a-citizen, in the best-case scenario. These are not 
middle-class but-lower class characteristics. They could be either women or men, but the 
problems presented are usually seen as men’s problems. They are so immobile that they have 
to be reached in their own localities and homes.  
 
Conclusions and discussion  
Different futures seem to be assigned to different young bodies. Young people are divided 
into those who have potential, those who will take care of others’ needs, and those who are at 
risk of marginalisation. Being able-bodied differs according to the context. Being a mobile 
body requires an ability to distance oneself from relations with other bodies. Being an 
employed body requires movement and investment in education, although not at too high a 
level. Being an included body, a citizen, requires an ability to use the services that society 
offers. Ideal future bodies are also different: for example, mobile workers, potential brain-
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drain workers, employed care workers, those who take care of the infrastructure, and citizens 
who accept the terms of inclusion and integration.  
While on the surface level young people are treated as a homogeneous group, their divisions 
relate to their gender and class positions. Gendered and classed ways of attaching to other 
bodies, places, employments and professions are reproduced and valued in the documents. It 
is also clear that the most optimistic visions are not for all. The Ministry of Finance (2010) 
actually discourages young people from aiming too ‘high’, from aspirations to creative and 
mobile work. Additionally, while these young people are told to follow the rules and 
complete their education on time, others targeted in mobility discourse are told that they 
should not take the rules literally, since it is better for their employability to take a year off 
and travel than get to their qualifications by a deadline. Cultural resources help when you 
play the games of education and employability: you have to know which rules to follow, 
which attachments are not good for you, and in which worlds your kind of body will find 
footing with ease.  
Young people are seen as a resource for others, for future economic growth and global 
competition, and for the maintenance of our society. They are also seen as a problem – if they 
do not learn life skills and become included. Neoliberal capitalism is in Finland slowly 
replacing Nordic social-democratic capitalism and its values. At the level of documents and 
youth policies this means that while many explicit aims are inclusive and social democratic, 
neoliberal rationality is creeping into document texts, changing the tone to a more exclusive 
and competitive one. Furthermore, when old institutions and youth policy tools such as 
workshops are integrated into the new discourse and new ideological context, at least on 
paper, their (ideological) functions can change.  
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i Austerity measures are directed to the public sector, while the hope of the economic growth and confidence 
towards the future is placed in the private sector. This creates the ‘new landscapes of inequality’ since cuts are 
unevenly distributed. For instance, female unemployment is affected by the cuts on the public sector. (Clarke & 
Newman 2012.) However, I am not in this paper examining the direct effects of the cuts but only the reflections 
of these ideas on expectations surrounding young people and youth policies.  
ii This focus on employment and education gives the EU a somewhat more neoliberal voice than would be the 
case if the issues of human rights were being inspected. The documents of the Commission’s youth unit are not 
included in the data, since they deal with youth issues on a more general level than those selected.  
                                                          
